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Is the Halting probability a Dedekind real 
number? 
Bhupinder Singh Anand 
In a recent historical overview, Cristian S. Calude, Elena Calude, and 
Solomon Marcus identify eight stages in the development of the concept of a 
mathematical proof in support of an ambitious conjecture: we can express 
classical mathematical concepts adequately only in a mathematical language 
in which both truth and provability are essentially unverifiable. In this paper 
we show, firstly, that the concepts underlying their thesis can, however, be 
interpreted constructively; and, secondly, that an implicit thesis in the authors’ 
arguments implies that the probability of a given Turing machine halting on a 
given input cannot be expressed as a Dedekind real number. 
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1.  Introduction 
In a recently arXived paper [Ca01], “Passages of Proof”, Cristian S. Calude, Elena 
Calude, and Solomon Marcus conjecture that: 
Knowledge is acquired through reason and by experiment. For a long time 
mathematical proofs required only reason; this might be no longer true. 
As the basis for their belief, they identify eight stages in the development of the concept 
of a mathematical proof: 
(a) The first period was that of pre-Greek mathematics, for instance the Babylonian 
one, dominated by observation, intuition and experience. 
(b) The second period was started by Greeks such as Pythagoras and is characterised 
by the discovery of deductive mathematics, based on theorems. 
(c) ... with Galilei, Descartes, Newton and Leibniz, the mathematical language 
became more and more a mixed language, characterized by a balance between its 
natural and artificial components. ... This was the third step in the development of 
mathematical proofs. 
(d) The fourth step is associated with the so-called epsilon rigour, so important in 
mathematical analysis; it occurred in the XIXth century and it is associated with 
names such as A. Cauchy and K. Weierstrass. 
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(e) The fifth period begun with the end of the XIXth century, when Aristotle’s logic, 
underlining mathematical proofs for two thousands years, entered a crisis with the 
challenge of the principle of non-contradiction. 
(f) The sixth period begins with Godel’s incompleteness theorem (1931), for many 
meaning the unavoidable failure of any attempt to formalise the whole 
mathematics.  
(g) The seventh period belongs to the second half of the XXth century, when 
algorithmic proofs become acceptable only when their complexities were not too 
high.  
(h) With the eighth stage, proofs are no longer exclusively based on logic and 
deduction, but also empirical and experimental factors.  
1.1  What is proof? 
The authors [Ca01] then ask, rhetorically: 
What is a mathematical proof ? At a first glance the answer seems obvious: a proof is 
a series of logical steps based on some axioms and deduction rules which reaches a 
desired conclusion. Every step in a proof can be checked for correctness by 
examining it to ensure that it is logically sound. In David Hilbert’s words: “The rules 
should be so clear, that if somebody gives you what they claim is a proof, there is a 
mechanical procedure that will check whether the proof is correct or not, whether it 
obeys the rules or not.” 
They note, however, that: 
In 1976, Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken proved the 4CT (Four Colour 
Theorem) ... No human being could ever actually read the entire proof to check its 
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correctness ... “The real question is this: If no human being can ever hope to check a 
proof, is it really a proof ?” 
The authors’ perception of the relation between truth and provability is reflected in their 
comments: 
... Godel’s incompleteness theorem (GIT) which says that every formal system which 
is (1) finitely specified, (2) rich enough to include the arithmetic, and (3) consistent, 
is incomplete1. That is, there exists an arithmetical statement which (A) can be 
expressed in the formal system, (B) is true, but (C) is unprovable within the formal 
system. ... But what does it mean to be a “true arithmetical statement”? It is a 
statement about non-negative integers which cannot be invalidated by finding any 
combination of non-negative integers that contradicts it. ... a true arithmetical 
statement is a “primordial mathematical reality”. ... The essence of GIT is to 
distinguish between truth and provability. A closer analogy in real life is the 
distinction between truths and judicial decisions, between what is true and what can 
be proved in court. How large is the set of true and unprovable statements? If we fix a 
formal system satisfying all three conditions in GIT, then the set of true and 
unprovable statements is topologically “large” (constructively, a set of second Baire 
category, and in some cases even “larger”). 
Prima facie, under the standard interpretations of classical mathematical theory, which 
the authors [Ca01] seem to implicitly assume, the above remarks can be taken to imply 
that the authors accept mathematical truth as being unverifiable effectively. It follows 
                                               
1 We note that this is an instance of the standard interpretation of Gödel’s seminal 1931 paper [Go31a] that 
may be misleading; we show in Anand [An02b] that Gödel’s meta-proof of his Theorem VI in the cited 
paper actually establishes his formal system P as omega-inconsistent. Hence, Theorem VI holds vacuously, 
and P is not incomplete. 
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that there could, then, be any number of (equally reasonable) ways of responding to their 
question: 
... what does it mean to be a “true arithmetical statement”? 
However, in their attempt to offer an ambitious interpretation of classical theory, the 
authors do not address the question: 
Can such latitude in the perception of fundamental meta-mathematical concepts such 
as truth and provability reflect a basic ambiguity in our definitions of foundational 
mathematical concepts? 
On the contrary, the authors seem to be comfortable with the, implicitly Platonic, 
suggestion that classical concepts of mathematical proof, and even truth, might actually 
lie beyond the ambit of direct intuitive cognition! They conclude that [Ca01]: 
If we accept the above assumptions about the biological and physical nature of 
proofs, then there is little ‘intrinsic’ difference between traditional and 
‘unconventional’ types of proofs as i) first and foremost, we have not access to truth, 
ii) correctness is not absolute, but nearly certain as mathematics advances by making 
mistakes and correcting and re–correcting them ..., iii) non–deterministic and 
probabilistic proofs do not allow mistakes in the applications of rules, they are just 
indirect forms of checking ... which correspond to various degrees of rigour, iv) the 
explanatory component, the understanding ‘generated’ by proofs, while extremely 
important from a cognitive point of view, is subjective and has no bearing on formal 
correctness.  
... more research will be performed in large computational environments where we 
might or might not be able to determine what the system has done or why ... The 
blend of logical and empirical-experimental arguments are here to stay and develop. 
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... There are many reasons which support this prediction. They range from 
economical ones (powerful computers will be more and more accessible to more and 
more people), social ones (sceptical oldsters are replaced naturally by youngsters born 
with the new technology, results and success inspire emulation) to pure mathematical 
(new challenging problems, wider perspective) and philosophical ones (note that 
incompleteness is based on the analysis of the computer’s behaviour). 
2.  Interpreting classical mathematical theory 
2.1  Standard interpretations of foundational concepts may be ambiguous 
Now, in [An03e] we note that, as is implicit in Mendelson’s [Me90] following remarks 
(italicised parenthetical qualifications added), standard interpretations of classical 
foundational concepts can, indeed, be argued as being either ambiguous, or non-
constructive, or both: 
Here is the main conclusion I wish to draw: it is completely unwarranted to say that 
CT (Church’s Thesis) is unprovable just because it states an equivalence between a 
vague, imprecise notion (effectively computable function) and a precise mathematical 
notion (partial-recursive function). ... The concepts and assumptions that support the 
notion of partial-recursive function are, in an essential way, no less vague and 
imprecise (non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than the notion of 
effectively computable function; the former are just more familiar and are part of a 
respectable theory with connections to other parts of logic and mathematics. (The 
notion of effectively computable function could have been incorporated into an 
axiomatic presentation of classical mathematics, but the acceptance of CT made this 
unnecessary.) ... Functions are defined in terms of sets, but the concept of set is no 
clearer (not more non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than that of 
function and a foundation of mathematics can be based on a theory using function as 
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primitive notion instead of set. Tarski's definition of truth is formulated in set-
theoretic terms, but the notion of set is no clearer (not more non-constructive, and 
intuitionistically objectionable), than that of truth. The model-theoretic definition of 
logical validity is based ultimately on set theory, the foundations of which are no 
clearer (not more non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than our 
intuitive (non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) understanding of 
logical validity. ... The notion of Turing-computable function is no clearer (not more 
non-constructive, and intuitionistically objectionable) than, nor more mathematically 
useful (foundationally speaking) than, the notion of an effectively computable 
function. 
The questions thus arise: Could the thesis conjectured in [Ca01] also be founded on 
ambiguities that are rooted in the standard interpretations of classical foundational 
concepts such as "mathematical object", "effective computability", "truth of a formula 
under an interpretation", "set", "Church's Thesis" etc.; ambiguities that may, moreover, 
encourage non-constructive, Platonic, interpretations by default? How would such a 
thesis fare if we could make these concepts unambiguous, and constructive, in an 
intuitionistically unobjectionable way? 
2.2  Can classical concepts be defined constructively? 
In Anand [An02c], we argue that we can, indeed, define these concepts constructively in 
terms of a small number of primitive, formally undefined but intuitively unobjectionable, 
mathematical terms as below: 
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(i) Primitive mathematical object: A primitive mathematical object is any symbol 
for an individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter, which is defined as a 
primitive symbol of a formal mathematical language.2 
(ii) Formal mathematical object: A formal mathematical object is any symbol for an 
individual constant, predicate letter, or a function letter that is either a primitive 
mathematical object, or that can be introduced through definition into a formal 
mathematical language without inviting inconsistency.3 
(iii) Mathematical object: A mathematical object is any symbol that is either a 
primitive mathematical object, or a formal mathematical object. 
(iv) Set: A set is the range of any function whose function letter is a mathematical 
object. 
(v) Individual computability: A number-theoretic function F(x) is individually 
computable if, and only if, given any natural number k, there is an individually 
effective method (which may depend on the value k) to compute F(k). 
(vi) Uniform computability: A number-theoretic function F(x) is uniformly 
computable if, and only if, there is a uniformly effective method (necessarily 
independent of x)  such that, given any natural number k, it can compute F(k). 
(vii) Effective computability: A number-theoretic function is effectively computable 
if, and only if, it is either individually computable, or it is uniformly computable.4 
                                               
2 We note that, as remarked by Mendelson [Me90], the terms “function” and “function letter” - and, 
presumably, “individual constant”, “predicate”, and “predicate letter” - can be taken as undefined, primitive 
foundational concepts. 
 
3 We highlight the significance of this definition in Meta-lemma 1 in Anand [An02c]. 
 
4 We note that classical definitions of the effective computability of a function (cf. [Me64], p207) do not 
distinguish between the two cases. The standard interpretation of effective computability is to implicitly 
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(viii) Individual truth: A string [F(x)]5 of a formal system P is individually true 
under an interpretation M of P if, and only if, given any value k in M, there is an 
individually effective method (which may depend on the value k) to determine that 
the interpreted proposition F(k) is satisfied in M.6 
(ix) Uniform truth: A string [F(x)] of a formal system P is uniformly true under an 
interpretation M of P if, and only if, there is a uniformly effective method (necessarily 
independent of x) such that, given any value k in M, it can determine that the 
interpreted proposition F(k) is satisfied in M. 
(x) Effective truth: A string [F(x)] of a formal system P is effectively true under an 
interpretation M of P if, and only if, it is either individually true in M, or it is 
uniformly true in M.7 
(xi) Individual Church Thesis: If, for a given relation R(x), and any element k in 
some interpretation M of a formal system P, there is an individually effective method 
such that it will determine whether R(k) holds in M or not, then every element of the 
domain D of M is the interpretation of some term of P, and there is some P-formula 
[R'(x)] such that: 
                                                                                                                                            
treat it as equivalent to the assertion: A number-theoretic function F(x)] of a formal system P is effectively 
computable if, and only if, it is both individually computable, and uniformly computable. 
 
5 We use square brackets to distinguish between the uninterpreted string [F] of a formal system, and the 
symbolic expression “F” that corresponds to it under a given interpretation that unambiguously assigns 
formal, or intuitive, meanings to each individual symbol of the expression “F”. 
 
6 In Anand [An02c], we argue that, under a constructive interpretation of formal Peano Arithmetic, Gödel’s 
undecidable proposition, is individually, but not uniformly, true under the standard interpretation. See also 
Anand [An03d]. 
 
7 We note that, classically, Tarski’s definition of the truth of a formal proposition under an interpretation 
(cf. [Me64], p49-52) does not distinguish between the two cases. The implicitly accepted (standard) 
interpretation of the definition appears, prima facie, to be the non-constructive assertion: A string [F(x)] of 
a formal system P is true under an interpretation M of P if, and only if, it is both uniformly true in M, and 
individually true in M. 
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R(k) holds in M if, and only if, [R'(k)] is P-provable. 
(In other words, the Individual Church Thesis postulates that, if a relation R is 
effectively decidable individually (possibly non-algorithmically) in an interpretation 
M of some formal system P, then R is expressible in P, and its domain necessarily 
consists of only mathematical objects, even if the predicate letter R is not, itself, a 
mathematical object.) 
(xii) Uniform Church Thesis: If, in some interpretation M of a formal system P, 
there is a uniformly effective method such that, for a given relation R(x), and any 
element k in M, it will determine whether R(k) holds in M or not, then R(x) is the 
interpretation in M of a P-formula [R(x)], and: 
   R(k) holds in M if, and only if, [R(k)] is P-provable. 
(Thus, the Uniform Church Thesis postulates that, if a relation R is effectively 
decidable uniformly (necessarily algorithmically) in an interpretation M of a formal 
system P, then, firstly, R is expressible in P, and, secondly, the predicate letter R, and 
all the elements in the domain of the relation R, are necessarily mathematical objects.) 
2.3  Standard interpretations may admit ambiguity 
As we remark in Anand [An03f], the vagueness, and implicitly implied non-
constructivity, alluded to in Mendelson’s remarks may simply: 
... reflect, and result from, the non-specification of an effective method for 
determining that the infinity of intuitive assertions, which are implicit in Tarski’s 
definition of the truth of a formula of a formal system under an interpretation, are, 
indeed, individually verifiable.  
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Thus, Tarski’s definitions may be seen as implicitly implying, firstly, that 
relationships may exist only Platonically between the abstract elements of the domain 
of some model M, since there is no assurance that every such element is 
constructively definable, or representable, in every model M of PA8; and, secondly, 
that even when such relationships, in some cases, are asserted as holding in M 
intuitively, this may not be in any effectively verifiable manner. 
As we note subsequently [An03f]: 
Clearly, what we see here is the thin end of the wedge that keeps the door ajar for the 
entry of non-constructive, Platonic, elements into the standard interpretations of 
classical theories; elements that can then be interpreted ambiguously - often creating a 
mathematical tower of Babel containing frustrated purists, and confused neophytes! 
2.4  Reducing Tarskian truth and satisfiability to provability 
We also argue further that [An03f]: 
... if we introduce the concept of effective truth, based on effective methods of 
verification as suggested above, then we effectively reduce any verifiable truth in the 
model M to provability in PA. In other words, what such constructive definitions and 
theses essentially suggest is that, in order to make Tarski’s definitions of truth and 
satisfiability effectively verifiable in any model M of PA, we should be able to argue 
that: 
(i) If a string [R(x)] is PA-provable, then its interpretation R(x) in M is both 
individually true and uniformly true; hence, viewed as a Boolean function, R(x) is 
Turing-computable. 
                                               
8 Standard first order Peano Arithmetic such as Mendelson’s formal system S ([Me64], p102). 
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(ii) If a string [R(n)] is PA-provable for any given numeral [n], then the 
interpretation R(x) in M is either individually true or uniformly true; hence, 
viewed as a Boolean function, R(x) is not necessarily Turing-computable. 
(iii) If R(x) is individually true in M (which we may express as (Ix)R(x)), then, 
R(x) is expressible (cf. [Me64], p117, §2) in PA; hence every element of the 
domain of M is the interpretation of  some term of PA. 
(iv) Uniform Turing Thesis9: If R(x) is uniformly true in M (which we may 
express as (Ux)R(x)), then [R(x)] is PA-provable; hence, viewed as a Boolean 
function, R(x) is Turing-computable. 
Now, whilst (i), and (ii), seem, prima facie, consistent with standard interpretations of 
Tarski’s definitions, (iii) clearly does not follow from them; however, as the 
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem ([Me64], p69, Corollary 2.16) suggests, it may not be 
inconsistent with such interpretations. It is not obvious whether (iv) is independent of, 
equivalent to, or a consequence of the Individual and Uniform Church Theses. 
2.5  Some consequences of a constructive interpretation 
We then conclude that [An03f]: 
... the significance of constructively interpreting foundational concepts and assertions 
of classical mathematics is that: 
(i) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that a formula [R] is P-provable if, and 
only if, [R] is uniformly true in some interpretation M of P. 
                                               
9 We introduce an equivalent statement of this as an independent Quantum Halting Hypothesis in Anand 
[An02d], where we show that such a thesis allows us to model a deterministic universe that is essentially 
unpredictable. 
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(ii) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that if a number-theoretic relation R(x) is 
uniformly satisfied in some interpretation M of P, then the predicate letter “R” is a 
formal mathematical object in P (i.e. it can be introduced through definition into P 
without inviting inconsistency). 
(iii) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that, if a P-formula [R] is uniformly true 
in some interpretation M of P, then [R] is uniformly true in every model of P. 
(iv) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that if a formula [R] is not P-provable, 
but [R] is classically true under the standard interpretation, then [R] is individually 
true, but not uniformly true, in the standard model of P. 
(v) The Uniform Church Thesis implies that Gödel’s undecidable sentence GUS is 
individually true, but not uniformly true, in the standard model of P.10 
By defining effective computability, both individually and uniformly, along similar 
lines, we can give a constructive definition of uncomputable number-theoretic 
functions: 
(vi) A number-theoretic function F(x1, ..., xn) in the standard interpretation M of P 
is uncomputable if, and only if, it is effectively computable individually, but not 
effectively computable uniformly. 
This, last, removes the mysticism behind the fact that we can constructively define a 
number-theoretic Halting function that is, paradoxically, Turing-uncomputable. 
                                               
10 An intriguing consequence of this argument is considered in Appendix 1 of Anand [An03c]. 
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(vii) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, then every partial recursive number-
theoretic function F(x1, ..., xn) has a unique constructive extension as a total 
function. 
(viii) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, then the classical Halting problem is 
effectively solvable.11 
(ix) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, then not every effectively 
computable function is classically Turing computable (so Turing’s Thesis does 
not, then, hold). 
(x) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, then not every (partially) recursive 
function is classically Turing-computable.12 
(xi) If we assume a Uniform Church Thesis, then the class P of polynomial-time 
languages in the P versus NP problem may not define a formal mathematical 
object. 
Further, since a number-theoretic relation is expressible in P if, and only if, it is 
recursive ([Me64], p142, Corollary 3.29), it follows, as Mendelson argues, that the 
classical Church’s Thesis can, indeed, be viewed as: 
(xii) Church’s Theorem: The Individual Church Thesis implies that a number-
theoretic function is effectively computable if, and only if, it is recursive13. 
                                               
11 This was not included in [An03f]. 
 
12 The classical proof that every (partially) recursive function is classically Turing-computable uses 
induction over (partial) recursive functions, thus assuming that every such function is a mathematical 
object; by Meta-lemma 1, such an assumption is invalid. 
 
13 We note that the classical Church Thesis is the assertion: “A number-theoretic function is effectively 
computable if, and only if, it is recursive” (cf. [Me64], p227). 
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2.6  Defining formal, constructive and Platonic concepts 
Now, what we have essentially argued above is, as also noted in Anand [An03f], that: 
... a constructive interpretation of classical mathematical concepts recognises that, 
since Anand ([An02c], Meta-theorem 1) proves constructively that not every, 
effectively well-defined, classical, mathematical concept is formalisable in its 
intuitive entirety, we do not need to treat every non-formalisable mathematical 
concept as necessarily Platonic, and so outside the reach of effective methods. Ipso 
facto, we can distinguish between: 
(i) formalisable mathematical concepts (such as arithmetical functions and 
relations) that are within the ambit of formal effective methods (provability), 
(ii) non-formalisable mathematical concepts (such as recursive number-theoretic 
functions and relations) that are within the ambit of non-formal effective methods 
(effective truth), and 
(iii) mathematical concepts that are essentially unverifiable by any effective 
method, and which implicitly assume the existence of a non-constructive Platonic 
oracle of intuitive truth. 
3. Mathematical proof and non-algorithmic effective methods  
Accordingly, a more appropriate definition of mathematics and mathematical proof - 
which can be seen, prima facie, as a unifying thread in all the eight stages sought to be 
identified as distinct by the authors in [Ca01] - would be: 
Mathematics is a language where proof is the yardstick for unambiguous expression 
and communication. 
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3.1  Non-algorithmic effective methods: Gödel oracles 
The raison d’etre, and possible significance, of such a paradigm shift - from seeing 
mathematics as an expression of relations between a universe of abstract objects, to 
viewing it solely as a language of unambiguous communication - is reflected in Anand 
[An03c] and, more particularly, in the following remarks, reproduced from the author’s 
response to a correspondent14: 
Broadly speaking, ... Gödel's meta-reasoning (which is constructive and 
intuitionistically unobjectionable), actually establishes the existence of an 
undecidable sentence by means of an effective, and not simply theoretical, Turing-
oracle.  
If we ignore the details of his proof, what Gödel's oracle does is to effectively prove, 
meta-mathematically, that Gödel's undecidable arithmetical relation R(x)15 is such 
that, for any given natural number n: 
(i) PA proves: [R(n)],16  
but: 
(ii) PA does not prove: [(Ax)R(x)].17 
                                               
14 Reproduced from the correspondence between Michael N. Christoff and the author in the Yahoo! Group 
comp-sci-theory dated 1st May 2003. 
 
15 For “relation R(x)”, read “proposition (Ax)R(x)”. 
 
16 This is actually an implicit meta-lemma in Theorem VI of Gödel’s seminal 1931 paper [Go31a]; for an 
explicit proof, see Anand [An02a], §4.3(b)(viii). 
 
17 This, too, is an implicit meta-lemma in Theorem VI of Gödel’s seminal 1931 paper [Go31a]; for an 
explicit proof, see Anand [An02a], §4.3(a)(ix). 
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Thus Gödel's oracle effectively establishes, by meta-theorem18 (i), that, given any 
natural number n, we can always find some proof (which can be converted into an 
effective method) that the string [R(n)] is PA-provable (even though it gives no clue 
as to how we should go about finding such a proof in any, individual, case). Hence, 
the arithmetical sentence R(n) can be effectively asserted as true, for any natural 
number n, by Tarski's definition of the “truth” of the arithmetical predicate R(x) 
under the standard interpretation M of PA. 
However, because of meta-theorem (ii), there is no effective method for determining 
a PA-proof of the string [(Ax)R(x)], since such a proof does not exist. Hence, there is 
no guarantee of a uniform effective method (algorithm / Turing machine) such that, 
given any natural number n, it will determine that the sentence R(n) is true under the 
standard interpretation M. Such a uniform effective method would, of course, be 
guaranteed if [(Ax)R(x)] were PA-provable. 
Now, my intended thesis is that meta-theorem (ii), in fact, implies that there is no 
uniform effective method (algorithm / Turing machine) such that, given any natural 
number n, it will determine that the sentence R(n) is true under the standard 
interpretation. 
In other words, I intend replacing the classical Turing Thesis: 
(iii) A number-theoretic predicate F(x), viewed as a Boolean function, is 
effectively computable if, and only if, it is classically Turing-computable, 
with, for instance, a Uniform Turing Thesis: 
                                               
18 For “meta-theorem”, read “meta-lemma” in this section. 
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(iv) A PA-string [(Ax)F(x)] is provable if, and only if, in it's standard 
interpretation M, the predicate F(x), viewed as a Boolean function, is classically 
Turing-computable as true for every input. 
Now, like the classical Turing Thesis, the Uniform Turing Thesis cannot be proven. 
However, unlike the classical Turing Thesis, this thesis can never be disproved. 
The reason: The unprovability of the PA-string [(Ax)R(x)] means that we could never 
formally prove that a Turing machine, (algorithm) T(R), that computes the 
arithmetical predicate R(x), when seen as a Boolean function, will halt and return true 
on every input. In fact, in view of meta-theorems (i) and (ii), the Uniform Turing 
Thesis implies that any such T(R) will loop for some natural number k, even though 
R(k) is true. 
The significance of this is that a Uniform Turing Thesis also implies that the standard 
Turing Thesis does not hold, since Gödel's oracle is, then, an effective (non-
algorithmic) method that is not classically Turing-computable. By Occam's dictum, 
and since there is no loss of generality in replacing the classical Turing Thesis with a 
Uniform Turing Thesis, the replacement is to be preferred. 
The above is, essentially, the argument for introducing constructive Gödel oracles, so 
that we may extend the scope of effective methods to include non-algorithmic 
effective methods by means of a Uniform Turing Thesis. 
3.2  Defining Tarskian truth verifiably 
The significance of replacing the classical Church Thesis by Individual and Uniform 
Church Theses lies in the fact that, without these, there is no explicit convention for 
asserting Tarskian truth unambiguously. As we argue in the above correspondence: 
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One reason why Turing oracles may, so far, be viewed as offering theoretical, rather 
than effective, solutions to constructive problems of Theoretical Computer Science 
(such as, say, the Halting problem), could be that they are deeply wedded to standard 
interpretations of classical theory that, in turn, are rooted in Tarski's definitions, such 
as: 
(i) The PA-string [(Ax)F(x)] is true under an interpretation M if, and only if, F(x) 
is satisfied by every element s of M (i.e. F(s) holds in M). 
Now, the three significant points to note here are that Tarski implicitly assumes: 
(ii) there is some language, accessible to us, in which F(s) is expressible for any s 
of M; 
(iii) this is a language in which we can verify that F(s) holds for any s of M; 
(iv) there is some effective method to verify that F(s) holds for any element of M. 
Now it follows that, if we seriously intend to make our mathematical language precise 
and unambiguous, then: 
(v) we should introduce these assumptions explicitly as premises in Tarski's 
definitions; 
(vi) we should specify what we mean by an effective method that can verify that 
F(s) holds for any element s of M. 
Now, if we are not uncomfortable with accepting the Church-Turing Thesis (which is 
widely assumed to hold), then it is reasonable to assume that whatever we consider as 
an effective method must necessarily be arithmetic. It then follows that: 
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(vii) any effective method must either be a uniform effective method (algorithm / 
Turing machine), or an individual effective method (non-algorithmic / Gödel 
oracle); 
(viii) we can only verify that F(s) holds in M by an effective method if every s in 
M is the interpretation of some symbol [s] of PA. 
This is, essentially, the reasoning behind my introduction of constructive definitions 
of classical concepts such as "mathematical object", "individual/uniform effective 
methods", "individually true/computable predicates/functions", "Individual/Uniform 
Church Thesis", etc. 
Prima facie, it seems to me that the Uniform Turing Thesis, as expressed earlier, is 
actually a theorem that follows from the introduction of these definitions. However, it 
may, in fact, be an additional thesis; I am, at the moment, not quite clear whether the 
Individual / Uniform Church Theses should be treated as definitions or theses. 
Note that, if we leave (ii), (iii), and (iv) as implicit, hence undecided and ambiguous, 
then we are immediately prevented from making constructive assertions that would 
invalidate non-constructive interpretations of PA. We could, then, develop non-
constructive interpretations that are not necessarily claimed as valid or meaningful, 
but, by default, simply as valid, and possibly meaningful, till shown otherwise. 
However ... if we tolerate such ambiguities, then we are in danger of shortchanging 
scientific disciplines for whom mathematics is, essentially, a language of reliable, and 
verifiable, external expression and communication. Such a language should, clearly, 
be based on notions of formal truth that offer a maximum of precision in, and 
verifiability of, its assertions, with a minimum of ambiguity.  
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For most scientific disciplines, the authority of the standard interpretations of 
classical mathematics is seen, and accepted - perhaps with some element of 
reluctance, since such acceptance occasionally flies against the grain of observation 
and experience - not only as absolute, but also as implicitly promising sufficiency, 
when needed, to help bridge the seemingly unbridgeable chasm between a Platonic 
world of abstract objects, and the real world of sensory perceptions, that sometimes 
confronts such disciplines!  
4.  The Halting probability 
4.1  CCM’s Thesis and the Halting problem 
The significance of a constructive interpretation of classical concepts, as outlined above, 
for the arguments offered by [Ca01], emerges if we note that the: 
CCM Thesis: Turing-computability is equivalent to PA-provability. 
is implicit in the following remarks [Ca01]:  
Classically, there are two equivalent ways to look at the mathematical notion of 
proof: logical, as a finite sequence of sentences strictly obeying some axioms and 
inference rules, and computational, as a specific type of computation. Indeed, from a 
proof given as a sequence of sentences one can easily construct a Turing machine 
producing that sequence as the result of some finite computation and, conversely, 
given a machine computing a proof we can just print all sentences produced during 
the computation and arrange them into a sequence. 
Now, prima facie, the CCM Thesis seems equivalent to the Uniform Church Thesis, since 
it can be interpreted as implying that if a function f(x) is uniformly (Turing) computable, 
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then, firstly, f is a mathematical object and, secondly, the formula [(E!y)f(x) = y] is PA-
provable.  
It would then follow, from Meta-lemma 14 in Anand [An02c], that the Halting problem is 
effectively solvable; for, what we essentially argue there is that, given any Turing 
machine T, if there is an effective method to recognise whether or not a given string P is 
a valid input of T, then a CCM Thesis should imply that there is an individual, non-
algorithmic, effective method that will determine whether or not T will halt on input P. 
4.2  An effective solution of the Halting problem 
We reproduce this argument below. 
Theorem 1: The CCM Thesis implies that the Halting problem is effectively solvable. 
Proof: Given a Turing machine that computes a number-theoretic function F(x), we note 
that, by ([Me64], p233, Corollary 5.13), F(x) is partial recursive. We may thus assume 
that such an F is obtained from a recursive function G by means of the unrestricted µ-
operator; in other words, that (cf. [Me64], p214): 
F(x) = µy(G(x, y) = 0).  
If [H(x, y)] expresses ~(G(x, y) = 0) in a formal system of Arithmetic such as standard 
PA, we then consider the PA-provability, and truth in the standard interpretation M of 
PA, of the formula [H(a, y)] for a given numeral [a] of PA, as below:  
(a) Let Q1 be the meta-assertion that [H(a, y)] is not effectively true in M. Hence there 
is no effective method in M to determine that, for any given y in M, y satisfies [H(a, 
y)] classically. It follows that there is no uniformly effective method (algorithm / 
Turing machine) in M to determine that, for any given y in M, y satisfies [H(a, y)] 
classically. 
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Since G(a, y) is recursive, it follows that there is some finite k such that any Turing 
machine T1(y) that computes G(a, y) will halt and return the value 0 for y = k.  
(b) Next, let Q2 be the meta-assertion that [H(a, y)] is effectively true in the standard 
interpretation M of PA, but that there is no uniformly effective method (algorithm / 
Turing machine) in M to determine that, for any given y in M, y satisfies [H(a, y)] 
classically. 
Since G(a, y) is recursive, it follows that there is some finite k such that the T1(y) will 
halt, and return a symbol for self-termination (looping19) for y = k. 
(c) Finally, let Q3 be the meta-assertion that [H(a, y)] is effectively true in the standard 
interpretation M of PA, and that there is a uniformly effective method in M to 
determine that, for any given y in M, y satisfies [H(a, y)] classically. We then have that 
that [H(a, y)] is uniformly true in the standard interpretation M of PA.  
If we assume a CCM Thesis, it then follows (cf. [An02], Meta-lemma 8) that [H(a, y)] 
is PA-provable. Let h be the Gödel-number of [H(a, y)]. We consider, now, Gödel’s 
primitive recursive number-theoretic relation xBy ([Go31a], p22, definition 45), which 
holds in M if, and only if, x is the Gödel-number of a proof sequence in PA for the PA-
formula whose Gödel-number is y. It follows that there is some finite k such that any 
Turing machine T2(y), which computes the characteristic function of xBh, will halt and 
return the value 0 for x = k. 
                                               
19 We note that any Turing machine can be designed to recognise a looping situation; it simply records 
every instantaneous tape description at the execution of each machine instruction, and compares the current 
instantaneous tape description with the record. It can thus be meta-programmed to abort a loop, and return a 
meta-symbol indicating self-termination. 
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Since Q1, Q2, and Q3 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, it follows that, when run 
simultaneously over the sequence 1, 2, 3, ... of values for y, one of {T1(y) // T2(y)} will 
always halt for some finite value of y for any given a. 
Thus, the Halting problem is effectively solvable if we assume a CCM Thesis. 
4.3  Is the Halting probability a Dedekind real number? 
Now, the possible digital strings of length k (without repetitions) are less than 2k. If f(k) 
of these, when input to a given Turing machine T, yield Halting programs, the classical 
probability that any given string of length k will halt is greater than HPT, k = f(k)/2k. 
The classical probability that any given string of length less than, or equal to, k will halt 
is thus greater than HPT, i=<k = (Sumi=<k f(i))/ (Sumi=<k 2i). 
Since, by Theorem 1 above, we can determine f(i) for any given i, we can also determine 
HPT, i=<k as a rational number for any given k. 
The question arises: Does the non-terminating sequence HPT, expressed by < HPT, i=<1, 
HPT, i=<2, HPT, i=<3, ...> define a Dedekind cut? 
Now, since f(k) is determined by a parallel duo of Turing machines that is not, itself, a 
Turing machine, but which can be viewed as a deterministic Turing oracle, it follows that 
there is no uniformly effective method of determining f(k) (cf. [An02c], Corollary 14.2); 
in other words, although the number-theoretic function f(x) is a well-defined 
mathematical concept, f is not a mathematical object. Hence f(x) may be considered as 
determinate, but uncomputable; its values are essentially unpredictable, and so, by 
definition, truly random. 
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It follows that the rational function HPT, i=<k (viewed as a number-theoretic function over 
ordered integer pairs), too, is, essentially, (Turing) uncomputable. Hence HPT is also not 
a mathematical object, and so its range does not define a Dedekind real number. 
Moreover, since HPT, i=<k is effectively computable individually for any given natural 
number k, we may look upon HPT as a random mathematical function that, nevertheless, 
contains an infinitude of non-algorithmically computable information. 
4.4 Standard interpretations of the significance of the Halting probability 
We contrast the above with the standard interpretation of the relation of classical theory 
to the Halting problem, and of the significance of the Halting probability, as expressed by 
the authors in [Ca01]: 
In modern times a penetrating insight into the incompleteness20 phenomenon has been 
obtained by Chaitin’s information–theoretic analysis ... The simplest way to state one 
of Chaitin’s main results is the following ... : “If you have N bits of axioms, then you 
can never prove that a program is the smallest possible if it is more than N bits long.” 
The most striking results have been obtained by studying the Chaitin’s Omega 
Number, Omega, the halting probability of a self-delimiting universal Turing 
machine. This number is not only uncomputable, but also (algorithmically) random. 
Chaitin has proven the following important theorem: If ZFC is arithmetically sound21, 
then, ZFC can determine the value of only finitely many bits of Omega, and one can 
give a bound on the number of bits of Omega which ZFC can determine.22 Robert 
                                               
20 The significance of this may need to be viewed, however, in the light of earlier remarks in footnote 1. 
 
21 This theorem would, then, hold vacuously; it follows from Anand ([An02c], Corollary 1.1) that ZFC is 
not arithmetically sound, in the sense that it is not a model for standard PA.. 
  
22 This result may also need to be viewed against the arguments of the previous section; if the Halting 
probability is not a Dedekind real number, then it is not clear what arithmetical interpretation, or 
significance, is to be given to a routine that calculates “finitely many bits of Omega” or one that “can give a 
bound on the number of bits of Omega which ZFC can determine”. 
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Solovay ... has constructed a self-delimiting universal Turing machine such that ZFC, 
if arithmetically sound, cannot determine any single bit of its halting probability ... 
Rephrased, the most powerful formal axiomatic system is powerless when dealing 
with the questions of the form “is the m’th bit of Omega 0?” or “is the m’th bit of 
Omega 1?”. 
Clearly, the significant difference is that, since standard interpretations of classical theory 
do not explicitly distinguish between well-defined mathematical concepts and well-
defined mathematical objects, the distinction between a non-constructively defined 
Chaitin real number (Omega), and a Dedekind real number (which provides the 
foundation for classical mathematical theory) remains implicit; it is thus not clear 
whether the significance ascribed to mathematical assertions about the former can be 
meaningfully, and significantly, extended to the latter23. 
5.  Are mechanistic proofs of mathematical problems logically sound? 
In conclusion, we note that the pedantic point made by Robertson, Sanders, Seymour and 
Thomas, as quoted in [Ca01], about the reliability of their 1996 computer-generated proof 
of 4CT, can be seen as besieged sophistry:  
However, an argument can be made that our “proof” is not a proof in the traditional 
sense, because it contains steps that can never be verified by humans. In particular, 
we have not proved the correctness of the compiler we compiled our programs on, 
nor have we proved the infallibility of the hardware we ran our programs on. These 
have to be taken on faith, and are conceivably a source of error. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
23 In Anand [An03b], we argue that standard interpretations of classical mathematical theory may be held 
responsible for (misleadingly) encouraging a similar blurring of the distinction between Cantorian real 
numbers and Dedekind real numbers. 
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Although one may doubt whether their program is logically sound, there is no essential 
reason why such soundness cannot be established theoretically24; thus, there is no sensible 
reason to doubt the output, even though the relation between a logically effective method 
and a mechanistic computation is, indeed, one of faith.  
It is conceivable that an appropriately designed, and maintained, machine continuously 
calculating the digits of Pi may start outputting an unending series of zero's, perhaps for 
as long as a zillion years. Our belief that it will eventually output a digit other than zero 
comes about because of our faith that the machine is faithfully translating our theoretical 
calculations concerning the digits of Pi into a physical language of mechanical I/O 
devices; hence we believe, as an article of faith, and despite the physical evidence, that 
the series of zeros will not be unending. 
Similarly, the effective solution of the Halting problem consists of a duo of parallel 
Turing machines, where an assumption of a Uniform Church (or Turing / CCM) Thesis 
implies that one of the two will halt either because its program is a halting program, or 
because it recognises and halts due to an impending looping situation. Again, physically, 
this could take a zillion years in some particular case, and may call upon all our reserves 
of patience and faith. 
So, finally, what we should place our faith in is our ability to intuitively “see” the 
soundness of our axiomatic assertions, and theses, at the lowest, and not, as some believe, 
at a sufficiently sophisticated, level of understanding. This, of course, is the 
distinguishing feature of, for instance, Dedekind's formulation of the Peano axioms, or - 
                                               
24 Since every step of a formal proof sequence is either an axiom, or an immediate consequence of any two 
preceding elements of the sequence, each step can be effectively verified mechanistically by identifying the 
concerned axiom, or two preceding elements of the sequence. So long as each step is verified as logically 
sound, such a procedure need not be time bound, nor limited to the conceptual ability of any one individual 
to grasp, or even verify, the correctness of the entire proof. 
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as any high-school student can testify - Euclid's axioms for geometry; except the parallel 
postulate, these axioms are obvious to all, even if their consequences are not. 
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